at Google ScholarTitle data
Fink, Julian:
What (In)coherence Is Not.
In: Grazer Philosophische Studien.
Vol. 99
(2022)
Issue 2
.
- pp. 125-134.
ISSN 1875-6735
Abstract in another language
Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the
account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this article it is argued that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only
does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it also implies that an agent is necessarily incoherent
just in virtue of being in one attitudinal state.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Keywords: | incoherence; structural irrationality; Worsnip |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professor Practical Philosophy Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy > Professor Practical Philosophy > Professor Practical Philosophy - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Julian Fink Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies Faculties > Faculty of Cultural Studies > Department of Philosophy |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and psychology 100 Philosophy and psychology > 100 Philosophy |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Oct 2022 05:40 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Nov 2022 05:59 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/72483 |