Higher turnout increases incumbency advantages: Evidence from mayoral elections

Title data

Frank, Marco ; Stadelmann, David ; Torgler, Benno:
Higher turnout increases incumbency advantages: Evidence from mayoral elections.
In: Economics & Politics. Vol. 35 (2023) Issue 2 . - pp. 529-555.
ISSN 1468-0343
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12226

Official URL:

Abstract in another language

Abstract We analyze the effect of electoral turnout on incumbency advantages by exploring mayoral elections in the German state of Bavaria. Mayors are elected by majority rule in two-round (runoff) elections. Between the first and second ballot of the mayoral election in March 2020, the state government announced an official state of emergency. In the second ballot, voting in person was prohibited and only postal voting was possible. To construct an instrument for electoral turnout, we use a difference-in-differences strategy by contrasting turnout in the first and second ballot in 2020 with the first and second ballots from previous elections. We use this instrument to analyze the causal effect of turnout on incumbent vote shares. A 10-percentage point increase in turnout leads to a statistically robust 3.4 percentage point higher vote share for incumbent mayors highlighting the relevance of turnout-related incumbency advantages.

Further data

Item Type:	Article in a journal
Refereed:	Yes
Keywords:	incumbency effects; mayoral elections; turnout; voting in crises
Institutions of the University:	Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Professor Economic Policy and Development Economics > Professor Economic Policy and Development Economics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. David Stadelmann Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Professor Economic Policy and Development Economics
Result of work at the UBT:	Yes
DDC Subjects:	300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Date Deposited:	22 Jul 2023 21:01
Last Modified:	24 Jul 2023 05:45
URI:	https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/86271