at Google ScholarTitle data
Kadner-Graziano, Alessandro:
Vertical mergers without foreclosure.
In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Vol. 34
(2025)
Issue 2
.
- pp. 593-611.
ISSN 1530-9134
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12611
Abstract in another language
The typical concern about vertical mergers is the foreclosure of downstream rivals. In a vertically related industry where downstream firms have a common supplier, margins can reveal whether upstream competition constrains that supplier. I develop a test (based on margins) to identify whether the supplier is constrained premerger and, consequently, cannot raise input prices postmerger. However, even without foreclosure in equilibrium, vertical mergers can harm consumers. Vertical mergers increase consumer prices and benefit all firms, including downstream rivals, when downstream (horizontal) competition weakens sufficiently. This theory of harm differs from typical theories, which pit the merged entity against downstream rivals.
Further data
| Item Type: | Article in a journal |
|---|---|
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Institutions of the University: | Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VIII - International Competition Policy > Chair Economics VIII - International Competition Policy - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Fabian Herweg Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VIII - International Competition Policy |
| Result of work at the UBT: | Yes |
| DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 10 May 2025 21:00 |
| Last Modified: | 10 May 2025 21:00 |
| URI: | https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/93509 |