Focal Points in Negotiation

Titelangaben

Focal Points in Negotiation.
Hrsg.: Schuessler, Rudolf ; van der Rijt, Jan-Willem
Cham : Palgrave-Macmillan , 2019 . - XVII, 232 S.
ISBN 978-3-030-27901-1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27901-1

Angaben zu Projekten

Abstract

The study of focal points in negotiation originated with Thomas Schelling’s ‘The Strategy of Conflict’ (1960). Schelling’s informally characterized focal points were later defined as universally conspicuous options, whose conspicuity is common knowledge among all participants in a game or a negotiation. In this sense, simple catch phrases, round numbers, landmarks, and symmetric distributions form focal points. Game theory has shown that focal points can guide the solution of coordination problems in which the agents cannot communicate. In contrast, the role of focal points in real negotiations underwent far less scrutiny than their role in game-theoretical structures, among other things because communication seems to render focal points irrelevant in real negotiations. The planned book calls for a change in this outlook because focal points in practice often play a role in negotiations despite the possibility of communication.
To explain this fact, the conceptual apparatus of focal point theory will have to be reconsidered and adapted to the needs of contexts, such as negotiations, in which communication is possible. Case studies of the use and importance of focal points in political and international negotiation practice show that such steps are worthwhile. The chapters in the book also respond to the outlined conceptual problems and possible solutions for the strategic but also justice-related use of focal points not only in tacit, but also overt bargaining.