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Weighted Committee Games

Title data

Kurz, Sascha ; Mayer, Alexander ; Napel, Stefan:
Weighted Committee Games.
Bayreuth , 2017 . - 38 p.

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Official URL: Volltext

Abstract in another language

Weighted committee games generalize n-player simple voting games to m>=3 alternatives. The committee's aggregation rule treats votes anonymously but parties, shareholders, members of supranational organizations, etc. differ in their numbers of votes. Infinitely many vote distributions induce only finitely many distinct mappings from preference profiles to winners, i.e., non-equivalent committees. We identify and compare all committees which use Borda, Copeland, plurality or antiplurality rule. Their geometry and differing numbers of equivalence classes - e.g., 51 for Borda vs. 4 for Copeland rule if n!=m!=3 - have so far escaped notice.
They determine voting equilibria, the distribution of power and other aspects of collective choice.

Further data

Item Type: Preprint, postprint
Keywords: weighted voting; simple games; social choice; geometry of voting; equivalence classes; Borda rule; Copeland rule; plurality; antiplurality
Subject classification: Mathematics Subject Classification Code: 91B12
JEL: D71, C71, C63
Institutions of the University: Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility
Profile Fields
Result of work at the UBT: Yes
DDC Subjects: 000 Computer Science, information, general works > 004 Computer science
300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
500 Science > 510 Mathematics
Date Deposited: 16 Dec 2017 22:00
Last Modified: 18 Mar 2019 10:22
URI: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/41045

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