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Weighted Committee Games
Title data
Kurz, Sascha ; Mayer, Alexander ; Napel, Stefan:
Weighted Committee Games.
Bayreuth
,
2019
. - 25 p.
This is the latest version of this item.
Official URL: 
Abstract in another language
Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games. We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of alternatives in analogous fashion. We compare the effect of different voting weights (shareholdings, party seats, etc.) under plurality, Borda, Copeland, and antiplurality rule.
The number and geometry of weight equivalence classes differ widely across the rules. Decisions can be much more sensitive to weights in Borda committees than (anti-)plurality or Copeland ones.
Further data
| Item Type: |
Preprint, postprint
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| Keywords: |
weighted voting; simple games; social choice; geometry of voting; equivalence classes; Borda rule; Copeland rule; plurality; antiplurality
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| Subject classification: |
Mathematics Subject Classification Code: 91B12
JEL: D71, C71, C63
|
| Institutions of the University: |
Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics > Chair Economics IV - Microeconomics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility
Profile Fields |
| Result of work at the UBT: |
Yes |
| DDC Subjects: |
000 Computer Science, information, general works > 004 Computer science
300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
500 Science > 510 Mathematics |
| Date Deposited: |
04 Nov 2019 08:13 |
| Last Modified: |
04 Nov 2019 08:14 |
| URI: |
https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/53002 |
Available Versions of this Item
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