bei Google ScholarTitelangaben
Piering, Lorenz ; Seitz, Jan:
Political Connections and SEC Monitoring.
2022
Veranstaltung: 44th European Accounting Association Annual Congress
, 11.-13. Mai 2022
, Bergen, Norwegen.
(Veranstaltungsbeitrag: Kongress/Konferenz/Symposium/Tagung
,
Paper
)
Abstract
We examine the effect of firms’ political connections (PC) on SEC oversight. Capture theory
suggests that firms seek lower SEC regulation by contributing to politicians that control
SEC activity. Traditional measures of SEC oversight cover outcomes of SEC filing reviews or
enforcement investigations, disregarding that initial review or investigation decisions are not
included in this consideration. We provide evidence on the effects of PC on SEC oversight
using a novel approach that covers the entire monitoring activity by investigating SEC-initiated
EDGAR downloads. We find PC increase SEC monitoring attention in general, supporting the
idea that PC proxies financial reporting risk. Lobbying the SEC directly – as a measure for
direct firm-SEC connection – conversely decreases SEC monitoring activity in line with the
theory of SEC capture. These findings contribute to the literature by shedding fuller light on the
SEC’s behavior during the entire oversight process in the presence of PC.