Analysis of the Sadism-Egoism-Altruism Model and Comparison of it to Related Models

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Baumann, Michael Heinrich:
Analysis of the Sadism-Egoism-Altruism Model and Comparison of it to Related Models.
Bayreuth , 2025 . - 28 S.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15495/EPub_UBT_00008639

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Abstract

We analyze the Sadism-Egoism-Altruism (SEA) Model from Baumann and Baumann (2025) analytically. We prove that every finite game does not only have an outcome that is plausible in the SEA model when allowing for randomized strategies, but also the existence of such an outcome in pure strategies. Further, we show that all fairness equilibria according to Rabin (1993) are plausible in the SEA model. Although typically many or even all pure-strategy outcomes can be SEA plausible in a game, this model gives deep insights into the structure of the game. Since along with the fact that outcomes are plausible there come ranges for parameters modeling sadism or altruism making the respective outcome plausible, the possible behavior of the agents can be understood. Comparisons to the Fehr-Schmidt und Bolton-Ockenfels models are done. Via the well-known Prisoner's dilemma the SEA model is illustrated for mixed strategies, too. This work opens doors for manifold future research.